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Slobogin: Having It Both Ways: Proof that the U.S. Supreme Court Is "Unfair

EXCESSIVE CRIMINAL JUSTICE CASELOADS:
CHALLENGING THE CONVENTIONAL WISDOM
Jerold H. Israel*
Since the mid-1960s, no element of the criminal justice environment
has received more attention and been accorded greater importance, in
both popular and professional commentary, than has the pressure of
heavy caseloads. The lack of sufficient resources to deal with overbearing caseloads has been widely characterized as the most pervasive and
most critical administrative challenge faced by police, prosecutors,
public defenders, and courts.' National commissions have regularly
complained that the criminal justice system is "overcrowded, overworked, [and] undermanned," and must be given "substantially more
money" to cure those ills if it is ever to perform all of the tasks
assigned to it.2 Academicians have maintained that expectations for the
process will never be met so long as it is "confronted by quantitative
demands that exceed the capacities of its resources and procedures" and
leave it "groan[ing] under a stifling and increasing weight of numbers."3
Administrators have rated excessive caseloads as their "number one"
problem,4 and have warned that the weight of caseloads have placed the
* Rood Eminent Scholar, University of Florida; Alene & Allan F Smith Professor of
Law Emeritus, University of Michigan; LL.B., 1959, Yale University.
1. No mention is made of corrections only because the caseload difficulties faced by
corrections agencies are somewhat distinct. I do not mean to suggest that they also do not face
caseload pressures. See, e.g., Christopher J. Mumola & Allen J. Beck, Prisonersin 1996, in U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS BULLETIN 8 tbl.10 (NCJ-164619,
June 1997) (stating that state prisons in the 1990s have operated between 116-118% of the
highest measure of their maximum capacity and 124-131% of the lower measure of their
maximum capacity).
2. PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,
THE CHALLENGE OF CRIME IN A FREE SOCIETY x, 12-13, 281-82 (1967); see also NATIONAL
ADVISORY COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF AND PREVENTION OF VIOLENCE, STAFF REPORT:

286-87 (1969); NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON
A NATIONAL STRATEGY TO REDUCE CRIME 95
(1973) (recommending "decriminalization, screening, and diversion" to reduce caseloads). The
American Bar Association's Special Committee on Criminal Justice in a Free Society took a
similar position in its report. SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A FREE SOCIETY,
ABA, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS 39 (1988) (stating that more resources must be allocated to

LAW AND ORDER RECONSIDERED

CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS:

the criminal justice system).
3. Francis A. Allen, CentralProblems of American CriminalJustice, 75 MICH. L. REV.
813, 818 (1977); see also Edward Barrett, Criminal Justice: The Problem of Mass Production,
in THE COURTS, THE PUBLIC, AND THE LAW EXPLOSION 85 (Harry Jones ed., 1965).
4. See Stephen Gettinger, Assessing Criminal Justice Needs, in U.S. DEPARTMENT OF
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system "on the verge of collapse."5 Political leaders have even suggested that excessive caseloads have contributed to an increase in crime.'
The conventional wisdom on excessive caseloads holds caseload
pressures largely responsible for a variety of administrative shortcomings found at almost every stage in the criminal justice process.
Supporters of the conventional wisdom do not claim that any one of
those shortcomings is present everywhere (although some arguably are
to be found in the vast majority of at least mid-sized and large-sized
urban communities). As might be expected in an administrative structure
dominated by localism, administrative cultures of different communities
have produced a variety of ways of coping with the pressures of heavy
caseloads. The conventional wisdom simply maintains that all of these
shortcomings can be found in at least a fair number of communities, that

JUSTICE, NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN BRIEF 2 (June 1984) ("Overcrowded
institutions are the end product of a tidal wave of cases that has flooded all agencies in the
criminal justice system. When asked to name the most pressing problem facing their own
agency, administrators generally cited their version of the same phenomenon. Variations on the
response 'Too large a caseload' were given by prosecutors, public defenders, court officials, and
heads of probation and parole departments. Police talked about having too few officers.").
5. Hinds, PhiladelphiaJustice System Overwhelmed, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 15, 1990, at 1;
see also Kaufman, Crisis in the Courts, CAL. LAW., Aug. 1990, at 28; The Criminal Court: A
System in Collapse, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1983, at 1.
6. See, e.g., 121 CONG. REC. 34386 (1975) (statement of Sen. Edward Kennedy).
The result in all too many cases is that "crime does pay." Even if the
policeman on the beat catches up with you, the courts will let you go. Of the
730,000 adult felony arrests in New York in the past decade, only 31% were
indicted; of those indicted, only 33% were convicted; and of those convicted, only
38% were sentenced to jail. You do the arithmetic. The extraordinary result is that
97% of all adults actually arrested for a felony in New York were filtered through
the law enforcement system and escaped a prison term.
The reason for these astounding figures has almost nothing to do with noble
principles like the presumption of innocence or noble goals like the rehabilitation
of offenders. The reason is court congestion.... Defendants are processed at
breakneck speed through a system where bargains must be offered at every turn if
the system is to stay afloat-what bail can be agreed to, what hearing can be
postponed, what charge can be dismissed, what plea bargain can be made, what
sentence can be suspended?...
Effective crime control requires much more than that. The vast majority of
criminals are rational. They play the odds. Effective deterrence requires that the
odds must be reduced. A prospective criminal must believe that if he is caught, the
chances are high that he will be swiftly and surely punished.
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all are a product, at least in part, of the excessive caseloads, and that
taken together, they prevent the process from performing as it should.7
Caseload pressure is said to have its initial impact in a variety of
investigative omissions, driven by costs, that result in many offenders
escaping prosecution. Police departments, for example, will refuse to
carry investigations of misdemeanors (and even of some felonies)
beyond filling out a crime report unless the offender was caught in the
act or was identified by a witness. When investigations are carried
forward, resource limitations make certain more costly investigative
techniques (e.g., random interviewing of persons in the crime vicinity
and careful inspection of the crime scene for forensic traces) available
only for the most serious crimes. So too, it is argued, for all but the
most serious offenses, police commonly make little more than a
superficial attempt to locate known offenders who have fled or are
"missing." Limited resources force police departments to leave
apprehension of the offender in such cases to the chance that the
offenders will "fall into their laps" as a result of a traffic stop or an
arrest on another matter.
After police have made an arrest, the pressures of excessive
caseloads are shifted to the prosecutors. Caseload limitations are said to
force prosecutors to restrict prosecutions for misdemeanors and nonviolent felonies to cases in which there is such a high probability of
establishing guilt that the case can be characterized as "slam dunk" or
"open and shut" (or very close to it). Other potentially winnable cases
will be rejected on speculative difficulties--e.g., a witness who is likely
to have a change of heart-because the docket will hold only so many
7. This contention is supported by a series of studies that examine criminal justice
administration as practiced in specific large and mid-sized cities. See, e.g., THOMAS W. CHURCH,
JR., EXAMINING LOCAL LEGAL CULTURE: PRACTITIONER ATTITUDES IN FOUR CRIMINAL COURTS

(1982);

JOHN E. ECK, SOLVING CRIMES, THE INVESTIGATION OF BURGLARY AND ROBBERY

(1985); JAMES EISENSTEIN ET AL., THE CONTOURS OF JUSTICE: COMMUNITIES AND THEIR
COURTS (1988); JAMES EISENSTEIN & HERBERT JACOB, FELONY JUSTICE: AN ORGANIZATIONAL
ANALYSIS OF CRIMINAL COURTS (1977); MALCOLM M. FEELEY, THE PROCESS Is THE
PUNISHMENT: HANDLING CASES IN A LOWER CRIMINAL COURT (1979); FLOYD FEENEY ET AL.,
ARRESTS WITHOUT CONVICTION: How OFTEN THEY OCCUR AND WHY (1983); RoY B.
FLEMMING ET AL., THE CRAFr OF JUSTICE: POLITICS AND WORK IN CRIMINAL COURT
COMMUNITIES (1992); PETER W. GREENWOOD ET AL., THE CRIMINAL INVESTIGATION PROCESS
(1975); JOAN E. JACOBY, THE AMERICAN PROSECUTOR: A SEARCH FOR IDENTITY (1980);
NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, MISDEMEANOR COURTS: POLICY

CONCERNS AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES (James J. Alfini ed., 1981); PETER I. NARDULLI El
AL., THE TENOR OF JUSTICE: CRIMINAL COURTS AND THE GUILTY PLEA PROCESS (1988); JOHN
P. RYAN ET AL., AMERICAN TRIAL JUDGES: THEIR WORK STYLES AND PERFORMANCE (1980);
JEFFREY SLOVAK, STYLES OF URBAN POLICING: ORGANIZATION, ENVIRONMENT AND POLICE
STYLES IN SELECTED AMERICAN CITIES (1986); JAMES Q. WILSON, VARIETIES OF POLICE
BEHAVIOR: THE MANAGEMENT OF LAW AND ORDER IN EIGHT COMMUNITIES (1968).
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cases and can readily be filled with cases that either are far stronger or
involve offenses or offenders that present more serious crime control
demands. In a similar vein, preliminary hearing magistrates may reject
bindovers under a more rigorous standard than the legally prescribed
probable cause standard in order to keep the caseload before the court
of general jurisdiction within acceptable limits.
Once the decision is made to proceed with the case, the conventional
wisdom holds that resource limitations immediately push police and
prosecution to practices that are aimed at minimizing the effort needed
to achieve a favorable disposition. Police are pushed to emphasize
obtaining confessions through interrogation of the suspect because that
is the shortest route to developing incriminating evidence and the route
most likely to produce evidence so damning that the defendant will be
left with little choice but to plead guilty. So too, because the process of
obtaining a search warrant is often time-consuming, resource restraints
push police in the direction of utilizing searches that generally are
exempt from the warrant requirement--e.g., automobile searches-and
relying upon obtaining consent of the suspect or a third party for
searches otherwise requiring warrants.
As for prosecutors, major practices to obtain sanctions against
offenders with limited expenditure of resources include diversion
agreements and plea bargaining. The use of both is said to be heavily
influenced by excessive caseloads. Pretrial diversion programs allow
prosecutors to obtain dispositions in minor cases roughly similar to
court-imposed probation or restitution without having to take the case
through the judicial process. Prosecutors are said to use diversion to
lighten their caseloads without regard to the public interest in tagging
guilty offenders with criminal records and in obtaining jail sentences
where appropriate.8 Through plea bargaining, prosecutors can utilize
concessions-or threats-to gain guilty pleas and thereby avoid trials.
Of course, in some instances, as a result of a mutually agreed upon
evaluation of the strengths and weaknesses of the case, a plea would be
entered iri any event. The extremely heavy reliance upon guilty pleas
found in most jurisdictions, however, clearly exceeds that level. That

8. Consider in this connection the complaint of a former Los Angeles Police Chief:
[I]t is a fiat matter of policy that an auto theft is never prosecuted as a felony [in
our jurisdiction]. Most of them are not prosecuted at all, they are "no papered" and
the accused placed on probation, to avoid clogging the court's docket with stolen
auto cases when it is impossible to get robbery cases tried.
MASS PRODUCTION JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAL 69 (Charles H. Whitebread, II ed.,

1970) (statement of Chief Wilson).
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excess is attributed to concessions offered solely in response to caseload
pressures. So too, it is noted, even in those occasional jurisdictions that
do not rely so heavily upon guilty pleas, the primary alternative will be
another judicial proceeding that falls short of the fully contested jury
trial.9 The system simply lacks the resources to provide full jury trials
in all but a small portion of the caseload.
Heavy caseloads also are deemed critical in fostering judicial
practices designed to promote less time-consuming dispositions. Thus,
in jurisdictions in which judges have broad sentencing discretion,
caseload pressures are said to contribute to sentencing patterns that
convey the implicit message that concessions will be granted to
defendants who plead guilty or are willing to accept a bench trial."°
The implicit message further suggests that defendants who insist on
lengthy jury trials notwithstanding strong cases against them will receive
a harsher sentence for wasting scarce resources. Judges also are said to
seek less time-consuming dispositions by reducing felony charges to
misdemeanors where the likely sentence on a felony conviction would
fall in the misdemeanor range, and by imposing in misdemeanor cases
bail conditions that make it less costly for the defendant to immediately
enter a guilty plea than to meet the bail condition and await trial.
Throughout the process, caseload pressure also is seen as contributing to "routinized" and often uninformed administrative decisionmaking.
In an effort to keep the "assembly line" moving, judges and prosecutors
have rejected as too costly and time-consuming a decisionmaking
process that requires examination of a large mass of information and
that seeks to tailor each ruling to the unique characteristics of the
individual case. They have sought instead to promote managerial
efficiency. They categorize offenders and offenses in general classes so
such decisions as prosecutorial charging, magistrate bail-setting, and
judicial sentencing can be made in a routine, fairly automatic fashion.
Moreover, it is argued, in applying such generalized standards,

9. See RAYMOND T. NIMMER, THE NATURE OF SYSTEM CHANGE: REFORM IMPACT IN

CRIMINAL COURTS 38-39 (1978). Some of these procedures may constitute in effect, a slow plea
of guilty, while others may simply be a less formal bench trial. See Stephen J. Schulhofer, Is
PleaBargainingInevitable?, 97 HARV. L. REV. 1037, 1046-50, 1062-87 (1984) (concluding that,
in the jurisdiction studied, a bench trial did not consume much more time than a guilty plea, as
the pretrial effort was similar, and bench trials averaged 45 minutes of the court's time while
the plea acceptance averaged 20 minutes).
10. In some courts, the message is conveyed by the assignment system. See HARRY SUBIN,
CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN A METROPOLITAN COURT 113 (1966) (noting assignment to criminal
division of "judges who are best able to move the calendar, primarily by guaranteeing light
sentences ... for guilty pleas," and practice of "allowing the defendant who pleads guilty to
select an amenable judge").
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administrators operate with "one eye on the clock and the other on the
checkbook," because their performance is measured largely by their
ability to keep abreast of growing dockets. The end result often is a
process that is "careless and haphazard"-"decisions are made splitsecond, information is often incomplete, [and] inferences are drawn from
negatives.""
Caseload pressure, it is argued, also produces a sense of frustration
and disillusionment that adversely affects the performance of police,
prosecutors, defense counsel, and judges. This effect on performance
contributes, in turn, to an even more widespread loss of respect for the
process. Whether innocent or guilty, a defendant is unlikely to hold in
high regard a system that seems to be interested primarily in the rapid
movement of cases. Victims and witnesses find frustrating a system that
is likely to require them to make several trips to the courthouse and then
disposes of the case without a judicial proceeding in which they
participate. Courtrooms that operate in the fashion of assembly lines are
not likely to convey the dignity and decorum that the public expects. A
system that is frequently criticized by the media for administrative
deficiencies resulting from caseload pressures, but not always explained
in that light, will eventually be seen as incompetent, apathetic, and
possibly even corrupt.
The conventional wisdom regarding the impact of excessive
caseloads has been challenged. Initially, commentators have questioned
whether all of the administrative shortcoming attributed to excessive
caseloads are truly the product of caseload difficulties. They point to
studies of pretrial delay and plea bargaining.
Although the conventional wisdom blames excessive caseloads for
the extensive delays in the processing of cases, empirical studies have
found no direct relationship between heavy judicial caseloads and
lengthy delays between the filing of charges and their ultimate disposition.12 While caseload size may bear upon the "complex network of
interactions" that affects the speed of disposition, the impact varies
considerably from one jurisdiction to another. The studies suggest that
extensive delay is more the product of the shared perception of the
courtroom workgroup-judges, prosecutors, and defense attorneys-that
other values are more important than achieving expeditious dispositions.'3
11. Malcolm Feeley, Forward, in FELONY ARRESTS: THEIR PROSECUTION AND
DISPOSITION IN NEW YORK COURTS xii (rev. ed. Vera Institute 1981).
12. See THOMAS CHURCH, JUSTICE DELAYED: THE PACE OF LITIGATION IN URBAN TRIAL
COURTS 24-30 (1978); MARTIN LEVINE, URBAN POLITICS AND THE CRIMINAL COURTS 226-45
(1977); NIMMER, supra note 9, at 85-87.
13. CHURCH, supra note 12, at 36-46; Carolyn Burstein, Criminal Case Processingfrom
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Similarly, studies cast serious doubt on the proposition that increased
caseloads lead to increased reliance on guilty pleas and therefore to
increased use of sentencing or charging concessions to encourage pleas.
Those studies have found no support for that proposition. These studies
examined the historical fluctuations of guilty plea rates and caseloads in
a single court or compared guilty plea rates and caseloads among
different courts. 4 They indicate that the high guilty plea rates in many
jurisdictions are spurred primarily by other concerns that make
resolution by guilty plea appealing to the courtroom participants
irrespective of the weight of their caseloads.
Commentators have suggested further that some of the same factors
that contribute to delay in case processing and heavy reliance on plea
bargaining, without regard to caseload, also produce many of the other
practices attributed to caseload burdens. A few commentators have even
been bold enough to suggest that a substantial portion of what is
credited to caseload pressure just as readily reflects the effort of
administrators to serve their own self-interests by maximizing outputs
with a minimum effort. 5 A sharp reduction of caseloads, these critics
note, will not be enough in itself to bring a halt to these practices. 6
Challenges claiming that other factors are the true source of many of
the administrative shortcomings attributed to caseload pressure are
telling, but hardly decisive. That some of the same practices can be
found in jurisdictions with lesser caseloads does not mean that heavy
caseloads cannot force their use. Administrators may let their selfan OrganizationalPerspective: Current Research Trends, 5 JUST. SYs. J. 258 (1980).
14. See Milton Heumann, A Note on Plea Bargainingand Case Pressure,9 LAw & SOC'Y
REv. 515 (1975); Peter Nardulli, The CaseloadControversy and the Study of Criminal Courts,
70 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 89 (1979); FEELEY, supra note 7, at 252-77.
15. See FEELEY, supra note 7. Explaining why conventional wisdom would naturally
prefer to place the blame on caseloads, Malcolm Feeley notes:
Whenever there is discontent there is usually a search for someone to
blame.... [The safest course] ... is to find... a nonreactive agency on whom
blame can be placed without fear of reciprocity-to blame a process rather than
a person. Pointing to factors beyond anyone's control avoids not only personal
responsibility but also the possibility of retaliation and recrimination engendered
by pointing to someone else. Furthermore, it is difficult to counter accusations
against processes. In the administration ofjustice, three types of nonreactive factors
have emerged as "the cause" of many problems confronting the system. Heavy
caseloads, understaffing, and inadequate funding are all "enemies" which everyone
can safely point to as causes for poor performance.
Id. at 269-70.
16. See id. at 271-72; NIMMER, supra note 9, at 21-22. See also the studies cited in infra

note 51.
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interest in minimizing effort lead to these practices even in the absence
of caseload pressures. This result, however, does not mean those
administrators would not be driven to the same practices by caseload
pressures alone even if they were willing to devote as much effort as
humanly possible. Indeed, it may well be that practices which originated
out of the desire of prosecutors, police, or judges to minimize their
efforts have now been continued as a practical necessity because of
caseload pressures.
Similarly inconclusive are studies illustrating that jurisdictions with
very heavy caseloads can nonetheless avoid some of the shortcomings
attributed to caseloads. What the studies do not show is what sacrifices
in other areas have been made to avoid that shortcoming. Thus, while
we know that significant pretrial delay has been eliminated in courts
with the heaviest of caseloads, we do not know whether these jurisdictions achieved that end by cutting comers in other respects, such as
offering better bargains for pleas, offering other inducements for bench
trials, or simply forcing prosecutors to trial ill-prepared. The studies
would be more convincing if they could clearly negate all such
possibilities.
The courts, in particular, have not been convinced by the commentary suggesting that the shortcomings that conventional wisdom
attributes to caseloads are in fact the product of other, totally unrelated
influences. The Supreme Court, for example, has pointed to the practical
necessities imposed by caseload pressure in refusing to impose a variety
of proposed constitutional restraints. The burden of heavy dockets has
been recognized by the Court in the course of justifying its refusal to
hold unconstitutional plea bargaining," its rejection of the claim that
the Sixth Amendment requires appointment of counsel to assist the
indigent defendant in a misdemeanor prosecution that does not result in
a jail term,"8 and its rejection of the contention that due process
requires the appointment of counsel to assist an indigent probationer or
parolee in a revocation proceeding. 9

17. Santobello v. New York, 404 U.S. 257, 260 (1970) (" '[P]lea bargaining,' is an
essential component of the administration of justice.... If every criminal charged were
subjected to a full-scale trial, the States and the Federal Government would need to multiply by
many times the number of judges and court. facilities.").
18. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367, 385 (1972) (noting the substantial costs that would be
imposed on the states if appointment were required for all offenses carrying a potential jail
sentence, with Justice Brennan, in dissent, suggesting that such a requirement could be handled
nonetheless by the use of a public defender system, which "can keep costs at acceptable levels
even when the number of cases requiring appointment of counsel increases dramatically").
19. Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 788 n.11 (1973) (noting "the practical problem
which would be occasioned by a requirement of counsel in all revocation cases" in light of over

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss5/1
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Another line of challenge to the conventional wisdom acknowledges
that caseloads are excessive, recognizes that excessive caseloads spawn
administrative shortcomings, but challenges the conventional wisdom's
characterization of the caseload-problem as steadily growing more
pervasive and becoming more urgent. It certainly is true that the
pressure of heavy caseloads is not a newly discovered phenomena.
Excessive caseloads were reported in the 1920s in the State Commission
reports that were an outgrowth of The Progressive reform movement."
Indeed, those questioning the severity of the post-mid-sixties "caseload
crisis" have pointed to the caseload numbers in those early Commission
Reports. They claim that those numbers are substantially worse than the
numbers complained about in recent years.2' Critics legitimately ask
why a situation that apparently has prevailed since the turn of the
century has become over the last few decades a matter of utmost
urgency. Supporters of the conventional wisdom respond that two
related developments over those decades have made the caseload
problem far more pressing today than it was in the past.
First, the extremely high caseload levels found today and in the
1920s have not been a persistent fixture of criminal justice administration. In subsequent decades, caseloads apparently were reduced
substantially from the levels of the 1920s, with the system reshaped in
that environment, but the caseloads then worsened significantly over the
last few decades.22 A combination of factors-including a crime wave
of "epic proportions" that started in the early 1960s and continued
through the 1970s,2 3 the war on drugs initiated during the 1980s,2"
100,000 revocation proceedings each year).
20. See Nardulli, supra note 14 (discussing reports of the Cleveland, Missouri, and Illinois
commissions relating to caseloads); see also NATIONAL COMMISSION ON LAW OBSERVANCE AND
ENFORCEMENT, REPORT ON PROSECUTION 104 (1931) ("The number of members of the staff of
the prosecuting attorney necessary to an adequate performance of his functions and the extent
to which the existing personnel in any jurisdiction falls short of this requirement, vary so from
place to place that, though inadequacy is probably existent everywhere in this country, no
statement of either fact or opinion can be made which would be applicable generally throughout
the country." (emphasis added)) [hereinafter WICKERSHAM COMMISSION REPORT].
21. See Nardulli, supra note 14; see also FEELEY, supra note 7, at 263-65.
22. This worsening occurred even though reduction of caseloads has been a major reform
objective since the 1960s, with efforts made both to increase resources and limit demand (by
such measures as decriminalization of public intoxication).
23. See CHARLES SILBERMAN, CRIMINAL VIOLENCE, CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4 (1980); Ted R.
Gurr, HistoricalTrends in Violent Crimes: A CriticalReview of the Evidence, in 3 CRIME AND
JUSTICE: AN ANNUAL REVIEW OF RESEARCH 295 (Michael Tonry & Norval Morris eds., 1981);
U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL

JUSTICE STATISTICS 1995 at 325 tbl.3.109 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., NCJ-158900, 1996).
24. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUG AND

CRIME FACTS, 1992, at 9 (NCJ-139561, 1993) (estimated arrests under state law for drug
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increased competitive demands for funding from other areas of
government, ' and difficulties in obtaining coordinated spending
increases among police, prosecution, and courts2 -led to an overall
failure of funding to keep up with the increase in crime, arrests, and
prosecutions.' Illustratively, the rate (per 100,000 inhabitants) of Index

violations increased from 676,000 in 1982 to 1,010,000 in 1991); U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, DRUGS, CRIME AND THE JUSTICE SYSTEM 172 (NCJ-133652,
1992) (dramatic growth in drug caseloads in federal and state courts, with a 61% rise in drug
convictions from 1986-88 in the 75 largest counties).
25. See U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, REPORT TO THE
NATION ON CRIME AND JUSTICE 120 (2d ed., NCJ-105506, 1988). Since almost 90% of criminal
justice financing comes from state and local governments, see id. at 116, the primary competitors
are the government services funded by those governments, such as education, waste disposal,
local transportation, and certain aspects of public welfare support. Even though control of crime
ranks high in public concern, some elements of criminal justice administration may not be seen
as competitive with such other demands. See Alexander Smith & Harriet Pollack, The Courts
Stand Indicted in New York City, 68 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 252, 257 (1977).
To advocate more money for the courts, however, is like advocating motherhood.
No one will disagree, but no one-not the city, the state or the federal government-will come forth with the money.... [Flew voters, despite their fear of
street crimes, care as much for the courts as for the state of the subways, the
schools, or even the garbage pickups in their neighborhoods. The courts simply
have no political clout in budgetary terms.
Id.
26. The different criminal justice agencies tend to have different constituencies supporting
their funding, and that funding often comes from different governmental sources, such as state
funding for courts, county funding for the prosecutor, and city funding for the police.
Accordingly, keeping funding coordinated is a difficult task. Funding increases tend to come in
spurts, and spurts often vary for different agencies. See REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 25,
at 122 (for 1979-85, per capita, inflation adjusted increases were 34% for corrections, 24% for
public defenders, 6% for prosecution, 0.2% for courts, and a negative 1.5% for police). Where
those spurts are heavily disproportionate in allocation, with substantial funding increases going
to one part of the process and not another, the end result is likely to be a bottleneck. See No
Trial and No PunishmentEither,N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 17, 1986, at 20 (discussing such a bottleneck
as a consequence of failure of court funding).
27. Data on funding since 1971 can be found in the various Bureau of Justice Statistics
(B.J.S.) publications in the series on Justice Expenditures and Employment in the United States.
The Census Bureau's statistics on government finance pre-1971 are not broken down into as
many categories as the B.J.S. data and therefore do not provide as complete a picture on
criminal justice expenditures. See REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 25, at 120-21 (comparison
of expenditures dating back to 1960 limited to police protection and corrections); U.S.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, JUSTICE EXPENDITURES AND
EMPLOYMENT, 1990, at 4 (NCJ-135777, 1992) (also including categories of courts, prosecution

and legal services, public defense, and total direct expenditures for justice activities). These
figures must be adjusted for inflation, which often is not done. But see REPORT TO THE NATION,
supra note 25, at 121.
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crimes increased by 278% between 1960 and 1985,28 while the
increased per capita spending on police, accounting for inflation, was
only 73% over the same period.2 9
Second, the conventional wisdom contends that the caseload
arithmetic tells only part of the story. Adding substantially to the
caseload pressure has been a series of procedural changes that made
administration of the process far more time-consuming. A 1977 article
on "the disastrous state of New York City Courts" is typical of the
commentary reflecting this viewpoint.30 The authors first note that,
between 1952 and 1974, the number of felony arrests increased by
500% while the number of police increased by a mere 88%. The authors
also note that the number of felony filings increased roughly sixfold
while the number of judges barely doubled. This disparity was sufficient
in itself to produce a "serious overload in the courts," but it was
"compounded by the fact that a felony trial in 1974 is a far different
procedure from the felony trial of 1952":
Due in large part to a series of Supreme Court rulings
which extended rights to indigent defendants which had
previously been exercised only by the well-to-do, felony
trial procedure has become substantially more complex and
Crime rates per 100,000 population, as measured by reported Index crimes are reported in

the annual reports of the Uniform Crime Reporting Program. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995, supra note 23, at 354-55 tbl.3.127 (collecting rates from 1960-1990).
Arrest rates per 100,000 also are included in the Uniform Crime Reporting Program. See id. at
423-24 tbls.4.18-.19 (comparison of arrest rates for Index offenses, 1971-1990). Prosecutions in
state courts are reported (but not adjusted for population growth) in the annual reports of the
Courts Statistics Project on state court caseload statistics. See BRIAN OSTROM & NEAL KAUDER,
EXAMINING THE WORK OF STATE COURTS, 1995; A NATIONAL PERSPECTIVE FROM THE COURT
STATISTICS PROJECT 51-66 (1995).
Data cited in the above sources suggest an overall failure of funding (adjusted for inflation)
to keep up with quantitative increases in workloads over the past three decades. Although there
were periods during which the shortfall may not have existed, or may not have been great, there
were others during which it was quite substantial, resulting in an overall deficit. See Herbert
Jacob, Keeping Pace: Court Resources and Crime in Ten U.S. Cities, 66 JUDICATURE 73, 83
(1982); see also HERBERT JACOB & ROBERT LINEBERRY, GOVERNMENTAL RESPONSES TO
CRIME-EXECUTIVE SUMMARY (National Institute of Justice, 1982); SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL
JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995, supra note 23, at 324 thl.3.109.
28. See SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS, 1995, supra note 23, at 354-55
tbl.3.127.
29. See REPORT TO THE NATION, supra note 25, at 120 (discussing state and local

spending). Consider also I NATIONAL INSTITUTE OF LAW ENFORCEMENT AND CRIMINAL
JUSTICE, NATIONAL MANPOWER SURVEY FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 22 (1978) (1960-1974 increase
in police protection personnel per 100,000 population was 49% while the increase in the rate of
known Index offenses per 100,000 population was 157%).
30. Smith & Pollack, supra note 25, at 253.
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time-consuming. Even in 1952, all felony defendants in
New York State were represented by counsel, but the role
of the defense attorney has changed markedly since then.
Pursuant to the Supreme Court's decisions
in Miranda v.
33
32
Arizona,31 United States v. Wade, and Terry v. Ohio,
defense attorneys can and do challenge the admissibility of
confessions, eye witness identifications, the legality of
arrests and attendant searches, and the propriety of many
types of police procedures. In previous years, neither
assigned counsel nor Legal Aid attorneys had the resources
or the appellate court encouragement to undertake such
activities. Today they have both. The result is that felony
court judges in 1974 sat an average of seven working days
longer than in 1952, but they handled only 14.8 trials each
34
as compared to 23.3 trials in 1952, a decrease of 33%.
Whether the Supreme Court rulings noted by the authors added
substantially to the length of the process is questionable, because
suppression motions tend to be common only in a limited class of
cases.35 Other procedural changes, such as the extension of discovery,
the provision of appointed counsel in misdemeanor cases, the expansion
of release on bail, and the addition of recordkeeping requirements, might
have contributed more significantly to the resources consumed in the
processing of cases." In any event, as Malcolm Feeley has observed,

31. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
32. 386 U.S. 218 (1967).
33. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
34. Smith & Pollack, supra note 25, at 253.
35. See, e.g., FLEMMING ET AL., supra note 7, at 168 (1992) (study of nine counties, with
populations from 200,000 to 1 million, found motions of all types filed in only 11% of the
sampled cases, and only 7.5% with deletion of one county in which public defender filed
motions to suppress in nearly 1/3 of all cases); Peter Nardulli, The Societal Costs of the
Exclusionary Rule Revisited, 1987 U. ILL. L. REV. 223, 228 (noting that for motions to suppress,
frequency in Chicago was nearly twice that in the nine-county study cited above, though
suppression motions still were not made in more than 10% of the cases).
Of course, the availability of such an objection may lead the prosecutor to offer further
concessions in return for a guilty plea that would avoid a time-consuming hearing in the
particular case. As a result, the full bearing of the Supreme Court decisions on the workload of
the courts, prosecutors, and defense counsel will not be reflected solely by the frequency with
which motions are made. See MARVIN E. FRANKEL, PARTISAN JUSTICE 90 (1980).
36. See Kenneth Pye, Mass ProductionJustice and the Constitutional Ideal, in MASS
PRODUCTION JUSTICE AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL IDEAL, supra note 8, at 1, 15-16 (citing, inter
alia: a 65% increase in all types of motions over 15 years; more defendants who gain pretrial
release and "consequently are less interested in a prompt trial"; the "severance of offenders and
offenses where joinder would formerly be the rule"; and the extension of "procedures designed
for felony cases" to "misdemeanors and petty offenses"); see also CLARENCE C. SCHRAG, CRIME

https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol48/iss5/1

12

Slobogin: Having
It Both
Ways:
Proof that the U.S. Supreme Court Is "Unfair
CRIMINAL
JUSTICE
CASELOADS

such process changes clearly "established a much higher set of standards
for evaluating the administration of justice," and those higher expectations naturally led "academicians and the media" to give special
attention to caseload pressures.37 Without regard to the additional
resources needed to comply with expanded procedural rights (or even
the expanding numbers), the weight of caseloads was more than
sufficient to become the natural target of groups concerned with the
discrepancy between the actuality of criminal justice administration and
the now "upgraded" "ideal of due process."38
As Feeley's observation suggests, determining whether (and to what
extent) caseloads exceed an optimal level is keyed to what one expects
the process to provide. Surprisingly, most critiques of caseloads fail to
clearly set forth this critical point of reference. The most formidable
challenge to the. conventional wisdom may be a challenge to its
underlying assumptions about the goals of the criminal justice process.
Many proponents of the conventional wisdom appear to assume that
criminal justice resources should be sufficient to allow for full investigation, full enforcement, and full utilization of the judicial processes in
every case. The police should have sufficient resources to investigate
every reported crime and to employ proactive methods likely to intercept
impending criminality. The prosecution should have sufficient resources
to prosecute in all cases where the police make an appropriate arrest.
The courts should have sufficient resources to provide appropriate
screening and to have "each case... naturally... resolved by means
of heavy combat in the adversary arena."39 Each case, in other words,
deserves a full-fledged jury trial with the defense and prosecution
exercising each and every procedural tool available to them.' 4

AND JUSTICE, AMERICAN STYLE 173-74 (1972) (also noting increased "maintenance and
utilization of court records" respecting a myriad ofjudicial processing decisions); Nancy J. King,
JurorDelinquency in Criminal Trials in America, 1796-1996, 94 MICH. L. REV. 2673, 2710-12
(1996) (citing a variety of factors that have added to the length of trials, including increased use
of expert testimony, increasing use of complex substantive laws, greater leeway granted to
counsel on voir dire questioning, and the use of a broader range of evidence).
37. FEELEY, supra note 7, at 268-69.
38. Indeed, Feeley suggests that it was the "upgrading of the ideal rather than an increase
in caseloads [that] probably accounts for the widening 'gap' between the 'ideal' and the 'actual
practice.' " Id. at 269.
39. Id. at 267.
40. See id. (stating, but not supporting, this position); see also Subin, supra note 10, at
112 ("volume problem" primarily responsible for the disparity between the actual process and
an "idealized process" which assumes "that the defendant is lead quickly through the pretrial
stage and into the courtroom, where the facts of his case are carefully sifted, and where his guilt
can be established only after the prosecution has shown that proof exists beyond a reasonable
doubt and that all of the procedural rules for bringing him to trial have been scrupulously
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A standard that thus proceeds on the assumption of full exercise of
governmental authority and full invocation of defense rights can be
faulted for its failure to take account of the element of discretion. In
granting discretion to the police, prosecutor, defense, and judiciary, the
process has recognized that there are instances in which authority or
rights may not be exercised appropriately for a variety of reasons which
are unrelated to the limitations of resources. Thus, a modification of the
full-exercise model would require that resources be sufficient to handle
the caseload as it develops in light of the exercise of discretion on
grounds unrelated to a shortage of resources.4 '
Under this second model, the optimal level of required resources can
take account of the fact that police may decide not to investigate or
arrest, and prosecutors may decide not to prosecute or to reduce charges
on various grounds that are consistent with promoting the ends of the
criminal law. Those grounds readily can lead to decisions not to proceed
because: the violation was technical and did not infringe upon the basic
interest that the law sought to protect; the offender has learned his
lesson and suffered sufficient harm as to make criminal punishment
unnecessary from the perspective of any of its goals; the case depends
upon the testimony of witnesses who, for good reason, would prefer not
to testify; a prosecution would be a waste of effort in light of the
availability and likelihood of prosecution in another jurisdiction; and the
greater good could be achieved by dropping the charges in return for the
accused's cooperation in gaining the apprehension and conviction of
others.42
Most importantly, the optimal resource level should recognize that
many defendants may desire to enter a guilty plea, rather than contest
the charge, and would do so without regard to any extra incentives
offered by a prosecutor or court based upon the public resources saved
by avoiding trial.43 A defendant may prefer to plead guilty for several
reasons: the case against him is clear and a trial will be a waste of time,
observed").
41. See CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 2, at 40-41 (accepting the legitimacy of
plea bargaining "based upon a fair assessment of the likely outcome of the trial and the likely
sentence if the defendant should be convicted," but arguing that "[tihe situation is different when
a primary motivating factor is the knowledge that available resources will only allow for a very
small number of trials").
42. See A.B.A. STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND
THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 3-3.9 (3d ed. 1993); NATIONAL DISTRICT ATTORNEYS ASSOCIATION,
NATIONAL PROSECUTION STANDARDS § 43.1-43.6 (2d ed. 1991).
43. See ALASKA JUDICIAL COUNCIL, ALASKA'S PLEA BARGAINING BAN RE-EVALUATED
102-08, 118-20 (1991) (attributing pleas to defendants' concerns relating to trial stress, wasting
resources, and increasing the sentencing judge's exposure to the facts of the case); CRIMINAL
JUSTICE IN CRISIS, supra note 2, at 40-41, 67; NARDULLI ET AL., supra note 7, at 210-11.
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effort, and the defendant's resources; the defendant feels or wishes to
show remorse; the defendant weighs the stress and other costs of a trial
more heavily than a possible conviction and sentence;" or the defendant prefers to compromise on disputed issues of fact and law and limit
his exposure rather than take his chances at trial.
How often would investigations be abandoned, winnable cases not
be prosecuted, and prosecuted cases resolved by guilty pleas if these
decisions were not influenced by limited police, prosecutorial, and
judicial resources? There is no ready point of reference because there
has been no time in our history when we had both adequate records and
sufficient resources for police, prosecutors, and judges." Certainly,
however, the resources needed to avoid caseload pressure in such a
world would be significantly less than those in a world with full
exercise of governmental authority and full exercise of defense rights.
Still a third model would proceed from a utilitarian perspective,
measuring resource needs by reference to a goal of effectively implementing the enforcement of the criminal law while adhering to all legal
requirements. From this utilitarian perspective, police investigative
resources must be sufficient only to control crime through deterrence
and incapacitation. 6 Resources must be devoted to criminal investigation "only up to the point at which the marginal cost of prevention

44. Defendants in misdemeanor cases often will find that the costs of pursuing a
trial-time and wages lost, lawyer's fees, etc.-will outweigh the magnitude of the sentence
likely to be imposed, and therefore will prefer a quick disposition through a guilty plea. Indeed,
the resources provided to the magistrate court can appropriately anticipate trials as a fairly rare
event. See FEELEY, supra note 7, at 276-77. Of course, when counsel is provided by the state
without charge, the costs to the accused individuals of exercising their rights are altered. One
of the difficult policy questions posed by this model is whether it is appropriate for the system
to impose different costs designed to deter the exercise of rights by indigents where most
accused persons with retained lawyers would view the exercise as not worth its financial cost.
45. See, e.g., WICKERSHAM COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 20; see also King, supra
note 36, at 2680-81 (noting that the lighter dockets of the nineteenth century were often
combined with infrequent judicial terms, resulting in considerable caseload pressure as all cases
filed in the interim period had to be disposed of in the upcoming term).
46. As I have discussed elsewhere, the goals of the substantive criminal law constitute a
key reference in determining what is necessary for "effective" enforcement through the criminal
justice processes. The utilitarian model rejects retribution or just deserts as a goal, treats
rehabilitation as, at best, a goal considered only in fashioning sanctions, and focuses on
deterrence and investigation as the key elements in criminal law and its enforcement aimed at
"crime control." See Jerold H. Israel, Cornerstone of the Judicial Process, 2 KANSAS J.L. &
PUB. POL'Y 5,6-8 (1993). For those who see the purpose of the criminal law differently,
particularly those viewing retribution or "just deserts" as the basic goal, the model obviously
fails. Id.; see also ANDREW VON HIRSCH, DOING JUSTICE (1976); WOJCEICH SADORSKI, GIVING
DESERT ITS DUE (1985).
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equals the marginal cost of the crime prevented."47 Some crimes may
cost more to enforce than the harm caused by the crime. If that is the
case, enforcement is needed only if it is valuable in maintaining that
respect for the law which also deters other more serious crimes. So too,
recognizing that a conviction on a guilty plea to a lesser charge may be
more cost effective than a conviction on a higher charge following trial,
the prosecution can appropriately offer incentives to defendants who
plead guilty and thereby reduce the cost of their conviction.48 The key
is whether the conviction on the lesser charge will undermine the crime
control objective of enforcement.
From such a utilitarian perspective, the optimal resource level
requires sufficient resources to allow for government exercise of its
enforcement authority or defense exercise of its rights only where that
exercise is likely to be cost effective to their respective objectives. The
prosecutor's objective, for example, requires no more prosecutorial
manpower than would be needed to ensure convictions frequently
enough, and at an offense level high enough, to meet the preventative-deterrence and incapacitation-goals of the criminal law. This
approach obviously requires a trial capacity, but not one that takes even
most charges to trial. Thus, one analysis of caseloads that proceeded
from this perspective suggested that the prosecutor must have a
"credible trial capacity[, which] means being able to bring to trial at
'
least 10 percent of the defendants coming before the court."49
That
capacity would be sufficient to gain guilty pleas from enough other
defendants to make criminal prosecution an effective deterrent.' As for
the defendant's exercise of rights, the defendant must be free to exercise
those rights but also free to relinquish those rights in return for leniency
if that choice suits his interests, as it will in many cases.
Unfortunately, few empirical studies even begin to ask the questions
of what level of enforcement is needed to achieve effective enforcement
under a utilitarian model and what level of resources are required to
obtain that level of enforcement without shortcutting the rights of the
individual.5 Common sense tells us, however, that some common

47. Louis M. Seidman, Soldiers, Martyrs, and Criminals: Utilitarian Theory and the
Problem of Crime Control, 94 YALE L.J. 315, 316 (1984).
48. See Frank H. Easterbrook, Criminal Procedure as a Market System, 12 J. LEGAL
STUD. 289 (1983). But cf. Stephen J. Schulhofer, Criminal Justice Discretion in a Regulatory
System, 17 J. LEGAL STUD. 43 (1988).
49. DAVID C. ANDERSON, CRIMES OF JUSTICE 176 (1988).

50. Id. (noting that caseload pressures in the New York City criminal courts pushed the
prosecutor far below this level to "no more than 0.5 percent").
51. See Nimmer, supra note 9, at 21. A starting point, as to police resources, has been
provided by studies asking the question of whether increased police staffing, above that typically
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caseloads in large and mid-sized cities are certainly too high even from
the less demanding perspective of a utilitarian model.52
found in American communities, results in reduced crime rates or improved clearance rates.
Those studies suggest the answer is "no!' as to an increase in itself, without changing the
deployment of the officers. See David Shichor et al., The Relationship of Criminal Victimization,
Police Per Capita and Population Density in Twenty-Six Cities, 8 J. CRIM. JUST. 309 (1980)
(number of police per capita negatively related to property crimes without'victim contact and
to nonproperty crimes and not strongly related to property crimes with contact); see also David
F. Greenberg et al., The Effect of Police Employment on Crime, 21 CRIMINOLOGY 375 (1983);
James Q. Wilson & Barbara Boland, The Effect of the Police on Crime, 12 LAW & Soc'Y REV.
367 (1978). Consider, however, 1 NATIONAL MANPOWER SURVEY, supra note 29, at 35 ("studies
have yielded mixed and-at times--controversial results"). C. Robert Cloninger, Crime Rules,
ClearanceRules and Enforcement Efforts: The Caseof Houston, Texas, 38 AM. J. ECON. & SOC.
389 (1979) (large changes in police expenditures did have positive effect on clearance and
crimes rates).
The best available comparative caseload statistics are for trial courts of general jurisdiction,
where weighted caseloads are used. See OSTROM & KAUDER, supra note 27, at 83-97. These
statistics generally have not been combined with a comparative analysis of performance apart
from type and speed of disposition. Of course, to measure performance, one must first determine
what should be achieved through the system and how those objectives will be reflected in the
application of the process. The literature does provide some starting points for this task. See
HENRY S. RUTH, RESEARCH PRIORITIES FOR CRIME REDUCTION EFFORTS (1977); SORREL
WILDHORN ET AL., INDICATORS OF JUSTICE: MEASURING THE PERFORMANCE OF PROSECUTION,
DEFENSE, AND COURT AGENCIES INVOLVED IN FELONY PROCEEDINGS (1976).

52. Caseload critiques reflecting the conventional wisdom have concentrated on large and
mid-sized cities, as surveys have noted substantial variations tied to the size of the community.
See, e.g., JACOBY, supra note 7, at 56 (National Center for Prosecution Management's caseload
analysis found a "logarithmic relationship.., between census resident population and felony
caseload leading them to conclude that, despite all definitional and procedural variations ... ,
the relationship between population and felony caseload is stable"); DORIS M. PROVINE,
JUDGING CREDENTIALS: NONLAWYER JUDGES AND THE POLITICS OF PROFESSIONALISM 138

(1986) ("Caseload [for magistrates], not surprisingly, bears a strong relationship to the size of
the community in which a justice sits," with a correlation between the two of.67); RYAN ET AL.,
supra note 7, at 156 ("Caseload pressures increase as court size increases until the very largest
courts, where a slight drop in perceived pressures takes place"). Caseloads for judges and
prosecutors in smaller communities can easily be half that of their counterparts in larger cities.
See 1 NATIONAL MANPOWER SURVEY, supra note 29, at 38 (median felony-equivalent cases per
full-time attorney was 390 for prosecutor's offices with 10 or more attorneys and 206 for offices
with 1-4 attorneys); FEELEY, supra note 7, at 248 (New Haven Court handled roughly three
times as many cases per judge as comparison court in smaller community and its prosecutors
handled twice as many per prosecutor); PROVINE, supra, at 138 (lawyer-magistrates in larger
communities had caseloads over 4 times the median for non-lawyer magistrates in smaller
communities). But consider Albert W. Alschuler, Book Review, 46 U. CHI. L. REV. 1007, 103031 (1979) (suggesting that use of part-time personnel may produce similar caseload pressure in
smaller communities). Cf. OSTROM & KAUDER, supra note 27, at 15 (in a state-by-state
comparison of unweighted combined civil and criminal filings per judge of courts of general
jurisdiction, filings ranged from a low of 596 for Alaska to a high of 3841 for South Carolina).
Studies have cited particular smaller communities in which caseloads were so light that they
would not be excessive under even a full-exercise model of optimal resources. Thus, JACOBY,
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Magistrate courts can obviously accommodate a high volume of
cases if prosecutors are going to divert or dismiss a substantial portion
of those cases because criminal prosecution is not needed to achieve
efficient crime control and the vast majority of persons who are
prosecuted will plead guilty simply because that is in their best interest.
Those magistrate courts that have dockets approaching 20,000 cases
each year, however, are unlikely to be able either to achieve the
preventative goals of an effective criminal law or to allow without
sanctions the exercise of trial rights by those defendants who view that
course as in their best interest.5 3 With only a few minutes to give to
each case, the court can hardly ensure that the process will be administered in a way that reinforces respect for the law, that the sentences
imposed will appropriately discriminate between different types of
offenders, and that defendants will be made aware that their rights will
be respected if they should desire to invoke them.' Prosecutors
similarly are not in a position to draw necessary distinctions between
cases when the annual caseload per prosecutor approaches 500 felony
cases. 5 In particular, they are unable to take a hard line on offenders
requiring lengthy incapacitation, backed up by a willingness to go to
trial. Public defenders are not nearly as likely to accept without
opposition the wishes of even a small portion of their clients who might
want to reject a reasonable plea offer and go to trial when those
defenders annually receive over 400 felony cases per defender. 6

supra note 7, at 56, comments on a prosecutor "with a felony caseload of less than two per
month," and FEELEY, supra note 7, at 248, cites a magistrate's "daily case/judge ratio" of 4:1.
In a survey of misdemeanor courts, 60% of the judges from "small city/rural area" courts
characterized their current caseload as moderate (50%) or light (10%), and 22% noted that they
"never" encountered caseload pressure (with 32% stating that it was encountered only
"infrequently"). See MISDEMEANOR COURTS: POLICY CONCERNS AND RESEARCH PERSPECTIVES

B 11-12 (James J. Alfini ed., 1981).
53. For illustrations of misdemeanor courts with such caseloads, see Pye, supra note 21;
Rising Caseload in Manhattan Courts: A View From the Bench, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 15, 1987, at
11; REPORT OF THE CHIEF ADMINISTRATOR OF THE COURTS FOR THE STATE OF NEW YORK 14
(1988). Compare IOWA STATE COURT ADMINISTRATOR, 1993 ANNUAL STATISTICAL REPORT 42
(1994) (disposition per magistrate ranged from 902 to 2,560); COURT ADMINISTRATOR OF
PENNSYLVANIA,

1994

CASELOAD STATISTICS OF UNIFIED JUDICIAL SYSTEM OF PENNSYLVANIA

10, 141 (1995) (Philadelphia Municipal Court, with 22 judges, had roughly 44,000 misdemeanor/felony filings, 27,000 summary citations and provide criminal complaints, and 127,000 civil
cases, for roughly 8,750 per judge).
54. See LEWIS KATz, THE JUSTICE IMPERATIVE 140-41 (1980); SCHRAG, supra note 52,
at 170-71; Barrett, supra note 3.
55. NATIONAL MANPOWER SURVEY, supra note 29, at 38.
56. See Barrett, supra note 3, at 99; see also CRIMINAL JUSTICE INCRISIS, supra note 2,
at 42 (noting illustrations of caseloads of less imposing numbers that nevertheless were
categorized as "unmanageable" in light of the nature of the cases). Compare ABA STANDARDS
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The conventional wisdom is far from perfect, but neither is it lightly
disregarded as a bureaucratic cover for employee laziness or inefficiency, or another in a line of Chicken Little prophecies of "doom." What
is needed are some hard policy choices as to what exactly we want from
our criminal justice enforcement process and some hard data as to what
it would take to achieve these goals. It could even be the case that here,
as elsewhere, the conventional wisdom, with some refinements, is pretty
much on point.

72 (3d ed. 1992) (ABA endorsed
caseload standards of no more than 150 non-capital felonies per defender per year or 400
misdemeanors per defender per year).
FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, PROVIDING DEFENSE SERVICES
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